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Abstract 
In the last thirty years, the Old-Age Dependency Ratio increased nearly seven points in Brazil, from 
7.0 in 1990 to 13.8 in 2020. Projections estimate it will rise to 36.2 in 2050. 
Furthermore, the condition of the Brazilian public finance is very serious: in 2019 and for the sixth 
consecutive year, it was in a deficit. The imbalance was mainly caused by social security, in particular 
by the RGPS (Regime Geral de Previdência Social) pensions system. A reform was approved and 
started to be implemented this same year, but doubts persist about it being deep enough to guarantee 
the looked-for equilibrium. 
Given this situation, the purpose of our work is to provide new insights on the very long run survival 
of the Brazilian public pensions, under alternative change scenarios, for instance, the shift to a Defined 
Contribution system. Transition costs and the costs related to the existing minimum guaranteed pen-
sion, are accounted for. 
Findings prove that the reform started in 2019 will decrease the large deficit for the next ten years, but 
after this an increase will be observed, although smaller than the one in a pre-2019 reform setting. 
Therefore, the sustainability of the system will remain a critical issue and further and more effective 
actions will have to be put into practice as soon as possible. 
 
Keywords: Brazil; Pensions Reform; Defined Benefit; Defined Contribution; Notional Defined Con-
tribution. 
 
1. Introducing the problem 
(OECD, 2018) reminds that pensions are intended to offer adequate financial security to people who 
can no longer make a living. They could be financed by the State from general revenues, or through 
payroll taxes, on a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) system, or they could be fully funded through individual 
contributions and accumulated assets. As population ageing is speeding up in most OECD countries 
(OECD, 2019), growing difficulties to preserve pensions emerge. In 1980, there were two people older 
than 65 years for every ten people of working age in the OECD space; by the end of 2020 this number 
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is close to three and expected to be almost six by 2060. The working age population is expected to 
have reduced by more than one-third in 2060, in several countries. 
There is a consensus (Acosta-Ormaechea, Espinosa-Vega, & Wachs, 2017) about the demographic 
evolution having a very negative impact on the PAYG systems, as expenditure grows and revenue 
declines. It is necessary to prevent expenses from being too burdensome for future generations. For 
instance, Spain (Díaz-Giménez & Díaz-Saavedra, 2016) and Greece (Symeonidis, 2017), which pre-
sented severe fiscal imbalances, made radical reforms in their pension systems. 
The existing public pension system in Brazil is a Defined Benefit (DB) PAYG system. This is the 
type of pension arrangement currently prevailing in Latin America. Despite being the most widespread 
in the region, it is also the most exposed to potential demographic disequilibrium, which has led to 
sustainability concerns (Holzmann, Palmer, & Robalino, 2013). In Brazil, one of the main issues is the 
fact that last decades have been characterized by declining fertility and increasing longevity, which led 
to a quick ageing of the total population, expressed in an increase of almost seven points in the Old-
Age Dependency Ratio, from 7.0 in 1990 to 13.8 in 2020, cf. (OECD, 2019). Recent projections from 
the same source show a steep increase in the Old-Age Dependency Ratio to 36.2 in 2050. This means 
that there will be approximately 36 individuals aged 65 and over per 100 individuals of working age.  
Also (United Nations, 2019 a) provide evidence that both longevity and the number of people over 
65 are on a firm growth: 13.3 million in 2010, 20.4 million in 2020 and 30.4 million in 2030 (projec-
tion). The corresponding evolution of life expectancy at birth is 74.3 years, 76.6 years and 78.5 years 
(projection). Additionally, life expectancy at retirement age (62 for women and 65 for men) is 22.7 
years for women and 17.1 years for men, based on the most recent life table in Brazil (Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2018).  
Along with mortality, fertility is an element of population growth, reflecting both the causes and 
effects of economic and social developments. In 2020 the fertility rate in Brazil is only 1.7. Following 
(OECD, 2019), the causes for the steady deterioration in birth rates during the past decades include 
postponed family formation and child-bearing and a decrease in desired family sizes, see Table 1 and 
Figure 1. 
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Table 1: Brazil demographic indicators 1990-2050 
  1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Population (𝟏𝟎𝟔) 149.0 174.8 195.7 212.6 223.9 229.1 229.0 
Fertility rate 2.7 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Young age pop. (≤ 15yo 𝟏𝟎𝟔) 52.4 52.3 48.6 44.0 40.9 36.4 33.1 
Young age pop. (≤ 15yo %) 35.2 29.9 24.8 20.7 18.3 15.9 14.5 
Working age pop. (15 to 64yo 𝟏𝟎𝟔) 90.3 113.3 133.8 148.2 152.6 152.1 143.8 
Working age pop. (15 to 64yo %) 60.6 64.8 68.4 69.7 68.2 66.4 62.8 
Old age pop. (≥ 65yo 𝟏𝟎𝟔) 6.4 9.2 13.3 20.4 30.4 40.6 52.0 
Old age pop. (≥ 65yo %) 4.3 5.2 6.8 9.6 13.6 17.7 22.7 
Dep. Ratio (old / working age %) 7.0 8.1 10.0 13.8 19.9 26.7 36.2 
Dep. Ratio (old / young age %) 12.1 17.5 27.5 46.3 74.4 111.6 157.0 
Life expectancy at birth (total) 67.3 71.0 74.3 76.6 78.5 80.3 82.1 
Life expectancy at 60 (total) 18.0 19.8 21.4 22.7 23.7 24.7 25.8 
Source: Authors, based on UN (United Nations, 2019 a) data. 
Figure 1: Evolution of the Brazilian population 
 
Source: Authors, based on UN (United Nations, 2019 a) data. 
To make the situation more difficult, is the fact that this demographic condition is only one side of 
the problem. The other side is that in 2019 the Brazilian public finance was in a deficit for the sixth 
consecutive year (Tribunal de Contas da União, 2019). The imbalance was mainly caused by expenses 
with pensions, which increased considerably in recent years. (The World Bank, 2017) estimated that, 
with no reform, the deficit of RGPS (Regime Geral de Previdência Social), which covers the private 
sector workforce, would reach 16% of the GDP, by 2066. If this is to be prevented, without changing 
the pension benefits, the contribution rate would have to double by 2035, to around 60% of gross 
wages. By 2065, when there will be two pensioners per contributor, the same source estimates the 
contribution rate would have to double again. 
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We must remark that the RGPS is not the only regime in Brazil. In fact, there are very complex 
pension systems in the country, comprising more than 2000 different rules (Secretaria de Previdência, 
2018), which makes the Brazilian case maybe one of the most intricate in the world. The system is 
divided into sections and sub-sections: a general compulsory scheme for private workers, multiple 
special compulsory schemes for civil servants, at different levels of government, and a voluntary com-
plementary scheme, available to all workers (see Table 2 for a summary; for more details, cf. 
https://www.gov.br/previdencia/pt-br). 
Table 2: Brazilian pension regimes 
 RGPS RPPS State-level schemes Complementary system 
Coverage Private sector Civil servants Civil servants All workers 
Nature Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory Optional 
Scope National Federal, state or local Federal or state Open or closed 
Management Public Public Mixed Private or independent 
Funding PAYG PAYG Pre-funding Fully funded 
Source: Authors, based on Ministry of Finance (https://www.gov.br/previdencia/pt-br). 
RGPS is financed through payroll taxes, made by employers and employees. It is composed of the 
urban and rural subsystems, where the first is contributory and the second is only partially contributory. 
The ‘Regime Próprio de Previdência Social’ (RPPS), for civil servants, exists at different levels of 
government. Some degree of pre-funding has been introduced at state level, as a few states have re-
formed their pension schemes. The complementary system is available to all workers as an option, 
being privately managed and fully funded. This system consists of either occupational or personal 
plans. 
In 2018, the combined deficit in the pension system was 5.9% of the GDP. The share of RGPS was 
almost half of it (2.9%), see (Secretaria de Previdência, 2019; Secretaria de Previdência, 2018). Figure 
2 shows the financial result in the RGPS (urban, rural and total) from 2010 to 2018. The rural area has 
been in the red since 2003 and the deficit has increased ever since. In 2019, it contributed to 57% of 
the RGPS deficit, even though having a much smaller number of beneficiaries. Moreover, Figure 2.b 
shows that the rural regime has never been in equilibrium, mainly because it seems to be more like a 
welfare program than a pension system - there is no minimum requirement of contributions for a rural 
worker to retire. 
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Figure 2: Contributions and Benefits (109 R$) (a) Urban, (b) Rural & (c) RGPS 
Figure 2.a – Urban 
 
Figure 2.b – Rural 
 
Figure 2.c – RGPS 
 
 
Source: Authors, based on Ministry of Finance (Secretaria de Previdência, 2019) 
Following the Chilean experience, cf. (Bonasia & Napolitano, 2006), some Latin American coun-
tries decided to adopt a Funded Defined Contribution (FDC) system. Brazil is not one of them, due to 
the concern about the fiscal imbalance and the high transition cost (Caetano, 2014). Additionally, the 
actuarial-finance imbalance puts pressure over the system and makes it more difficult to solve existing 
problems of inequality and poverty. This is aligned with (Wang, Williamson, & Cansoy, 2016) who 
argue that the full or partial change from PAYG to FDC did not solve low pension coverage issues in 
developing countries They consider this change turns out to be a “triple burden” for contributors: fi-
nancing PAYG for existing pensioners, paying the normal contribution and supporting low-income 
elderly relatives.  
Even though the FDC way has not been chosen, expenditure in social protection of the Brazilian 
central government is 13% of GDP, above the OECD average and close to some Nordic countries, 
such as Norway and Denmark. Figure 3 relates social protection expenses of the central government in 
OECD countries, in percentage of GDP, and population over 65, in 2018. We can see that only 9.2% 
of the Brazilian population was over 65, a low percentage in comparison to other countries, but the 
expenditure with old age benefits was high. 
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Figure 3: Social protection (% GDP) vs. 65+ old-age (% pop) in 2018 
 
Source: Authors, based on (Tesouro Nacional, 2020; OECD, 2019). 
Putting together the two sides of the problem, the conclusion is that the survival of the pension 
system is at risk and further reform is inevitable. This has been a recurrent topic of dispute in the 
Brazilian public sphere and in the academia. At present the debate is heated and there are a few im-
portant contributions. The most recent study (Afonso & Carvalho, 2019) was based on the proposal of 
reform initially presented by the government in 2019. Although the Congress has later altered many 
parts of the text, the study remains valid in many aspects. Results show that the proposal will reduce 
inequalities and the RGPS deficit, even if it is not very efficient from a fiscal perspective. Another 
conclusion is that the reform makes the deficit less unsustainable, but fails to eradicate it, implying 
that additional measures are necessary. 
This study aims to project revenue and expenses for the RGPS until 2100, with the sustainability 
of the system in view. Eighty years may seem a too long horizon, but not when the topic is the provision 
of old age pensions. For this purpose, a simple integrated methodology to project public pension cash 
flows over the long term will be applied. Particular attention is given to the items where spending 
pressures are expected to increase most due to demographic trends. The ultimate goal is to simulate 
the effects of alternative additional reforms, including the transition from PAYG to FDC, in spite of 
the shortcomings, or to a Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) solution. The paper is divided in four 
sections. Section 2 contains the model. Section 3 covers the different proposed scenarios. Section 4 con-
cludes. 
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2. Modelling a PAYG DB pensions system – the Baseline Scenario 
The International Monetary Fund (Acosta-Ormaechea, Espinosa-Vega, & Wachs, 2017) created a con-
sistent method to analyze pensions inflows and outflows, which will be implemented in this work 
through Microsoft Excel (Microsoft 365 MSO), using the most recent data available for Brazil.  It is 
important to point out that the focus is on the long-term projections, which explains the variables, 
assumptions and relationships included in the model, described in the next paragraphs (Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 2009; Miller & Castanheira, 2013). Although sometimes the model is approximate, relying 
on assumptions and relationships not entirely straightforward, cf. the Appendix for further detail, it 
gives a good insight to the problem and allows to undertake it with the available data. The starting 
point is a Baseline scenario, set by the 2019 reform. 
2.1. Pensioners and pension payments 
There are three groups receiving public pension benefits in the formal sector: retirees, survivors and 
permanently disabled. There is a fourth group, of non-contributory pensioners. Thus, the average num-
ber of pensioners receiving benefits in a certain year t is 
𝐵𝑛𝑓𝑝 = 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝 × 𝑙𝑝 × 𝑓𝑠 + 𝐵𝑛𝑓𝑠 + 𝐵𝑛𝑓𝑝𝑑 + 𝐵𝑛𝑓𝑛𝑐 , Eq. 1 
where 𝐵𝑛𝑓𝑝  is the total number of pensioners, 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝  is the population who have reached the av-
erage retirement age, 𝑙𝑝 is the labor force participation rate, 𝑓𝑠 is the share of the formal sector, 𝐵𝑛𝑓𝑠  
is the number of survival pensioners, 𝐵𝑛𝑓𝑝𝑑  is the number of permanently disabled pensioners and 
𝐵𝑛𝑓𝑛𝑐  is the number of non-contributory pensioners. 
To compute the aggregate amount of pension payments, is necessary to estimate the average annual 
pension for the existing pensioners (who have retired before year t). The average pension for current 
pensioners, 𝐴𝑣𝑃𝑒𝑛𝐶𝑏𝑑𝑏 , is computed by 5-year cohorts and by indexing the previous year average 
pension to the inflation rate 𝜋 , i.e., for each cohort, 
𝐴𝑣𝑃𝑒𝑛𝐶𝑏𝑑𝑏 = 𝐴𝑣𝑃𝑒𝑛𝐶𝑏𝑑𝑏 (1 + 𝜋 ). Eq. 2 
The need to use 5-year cohorts results from the fact that the existing projections (United Nations, 
2019 a) present data in this way. By law, pension benefits cannot be below the minimum wage (Cuevas, 
Karpowicz, Mulas-Granados, & Soto, 2017), but since the minimum wage also increases with infla-
tion, it is adequate to use it to model 𝐴𝑣𝑃𝑒𝑛𝐶𝑏𝑑𝑏 . 
Next, we calculate the average annual pension for pensioners who retire in year t, be 
𝐴𝑣𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑏𝑛𝑏 = 𝑟𝑟𝐴𝑣𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 , Eq. 3 
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where 𝑟𝑟 is the replacement rate for new retirees (Bogomolova, Impavido, & Pallares-Miralles, 2007) 




, 𝑡 < 2021
𝐴𝑣 1 + 𝑔 , 𝑡 ≥ 2021
. Eq. 4 
For 𝑡 < 2021,  𝐺𝐷𝑃  is the nominal 𝐺𝐷𝑃, 𝑤𝑠 is the share allocated to employees and 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙  is 
total employment, calculated as follows 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙 = (1 − 𝑢)𝑙𝑝 × 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑝 , Eq. 5 
where 𝑢 is the unemployment rate and 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑝  is the working-age population, defined to be from 
20 to 60 years old (men) and from 20 to 55 (women). 
For 𝑡 ≥ 2021, the assumption is that the average annual wage grows each year according to the 
nominal GDP growth rate 𝑔𝑛 , 
𝑔𝑛 = (1 + 𝑔𝑝𝑐 )(1 + 𝑔𝑝𝑜𝑝 )(1 + 𝜋 ) − 1, Eq. 6 
where 𝑔𝑝𝑐  is the real per capita 𝐺𝐷𝑃 growth rate and 𝑔𝑝𝑜𝑝  is the population growth rate. 
The average pension per pensioner, including all beneficiaries, 𝐴𝑣𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑏  is computed as the 
weighted average of the current and new pensions, and their weights are established by the proportion 
of pensioners in each cohort as shown below. 
𝐴𝑣𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑏 =  𝐴𝑣𝑃𝑒𝑛𝐶𝑏𝑑𝑏 𝑐𝑏 + 𝐴𝑣𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑁𝑏𝑑𝑏 𝑛𝑏 , Eq. 7 
where 𝑐𝑏  is the proportion of pensioners who have retired in the past and 𝑛𝑏  is the proportion of new 
pensioners (in the year). 
Finally, 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑏  denotes the total amount of benefits and is given by 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑏 = 𝐴𝑣𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑏 × 𝐵𝑛𝑓𝑑𝑏 . Eq. 8 
2.2.  Active workers and contributions 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑏  denotes the number of workers who make contributions to the system, 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑏 = 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑝 × 𝑙𝑝 × 𝑓𝑠. Eq. 9 
𝐴𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑏  denotes the average annual contribution per person, 
𝐴𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑏 = 𝑐𝑟𝑑𝑏 𝐴𝑣𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 , Eq. 10 
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where 𝑐𝑟𝑑𝑏  is the total contribution rate and equals the sum of three rates: the employee’s, the em-
ployer’s and the government’s, denoted 𝑐𝑟𝑑𝑏 , 𝑐𝑟𝑑𝑏  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑟𝑑𝑏 , respectively. Then, 
𝑐𝑟𝑑𝑏 = 𝑐𝑟𝑑𝑏 + 𝑐𝑟𝑑𝑏 + 𝑐𝑟𝑑𝑏 . Eq. 11 
Therefore, total contributions, denoted 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑏 , are 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑏 = 𝐴𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑏 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑏 . Eq. 12 
2.3. Net cash flows 
Using Eq. 12 and Eq. 8, the net cash flow is 
𝑁𝑐𝑓𝑑𝑏 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑏 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑏 . Eq. 13 
Next, we have the projections of contributions and benefits under the current rules, our Baseline 
scenario. In the following, results from all the other scenarios are compared with the results in this 
scenario. Using Eq. 1 to Eq. 13, results obtained are displayed in Table 3. Remark that the evolution in 
the revenue is mainly due to the changing aspects of the working-age population shown in Figure 1. 
Table 3: Baseline Scenario - Contributions and Benefits (% GDP) 
 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Contrib. 8.4 9.5 9.5 9.0 8.3 7.6 7.0 6.4 6.0 
     Male 4.4 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.4 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.2 
     Female 4.0 4.6 4.6 4.3 4.0 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.8 
Benef. 14.7 13.5 16.5 20.9 24.2 26.2 26.4 26.0 24.9 
     Male 6.3 5.9 7.7 10.0 11.9 13.1 13.3 13.3 12.8 
     Female 8.4 7.6 8.8 10.9 12.4 13.0 13.1 12.8 12.1 
Balance -6.3 -4.0 -7.0 -11.9 -15.9 -18.5 -19.3 -19.6 -18.9 
     Male -1.9 -1.0 -2.7 -5.3 -7.5 -9.1 -9.6 -9.8 -9.6 
     Female -4.4 -3.0 -4.2 -6.6 -8.4 -9.4 -9.8 -9.7 -9.3 
Source: Authors. 
Table 3 shows that in the 2020-2100 period, after a slight recovery in the next ten years (due to the 
impact of the transition rule), the disequilibrium of the system is going to expand until 2100, when it 
starts to recover again. This is explained by the demographic pressure. Furthermore, regarding females, 
it performs worse than regarding males because of the difference in the retirement age and the fact that 
women live longer. 
3. Reform scenarios 
In this section we propose a few scenarios that may shed a light on possible ways to reform the system, 
in order to achieve its future sustainability and actuarial-financial equilibrium. We start by showing 
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that the 2019 reform will be effective only to a certain extent, the reason why additional measures are 
required as soon as possible. 
3.1. Scenario 1 vs. Baseline Scenario: assessing the 2019 reform 
There are six transition rules associated with the enactment of this reform (Brazil Const. amend. 103, 
2019), but its material impact comes from the establishment of a new minimum normal retirement age. 
In short, it imposes a yearly constant increase of six months in the retirement age, until it is equal to 
65 for men and 62 for women (for further details cf. http://www.brasil.gov.br/novaprevidencia/#novas-
regras). 
We first assume a very unlikely ‘scenario’ (Scn1) modelling the pension system as it was before 
the reform, that is, retirement age is still 60 for men and 55 for women. Eq. 1 will be replaced with Eq. 
14 and 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑝   in Eq. 9 will be replaced with the expression in Eq. 15, as follows. 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑏 = 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑏  + 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝐴𝑔𝑒
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑛1
5
, Eq. 14 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑏 = 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑝 − 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝐴𝑔𝑒
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑛1
5
. Eq. 15 
where 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑏  denotes the pension-age population in Scn1, 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑏  denotes the 
working-age population in Scn1, 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝐴𝑔𝑒  is the cohort of the population that is affected by the reform; 
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑐𝑛  is 
 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑛 = 𝑟𝑎 − 𝑟𝑎 , Eq. 16 
where 𝑟𝑎  is the retirement age and 𝑟𝑎  is the retirement age before reform. 
 
Table 3 (cf. Eq. 1 to Eq. 16) shows a steady deterioration in the balance in a pre-reform scenario, 
reaching its peak in 2080 as 24.3% of GDP. 
Table 3: Scn1 - Contributions and Benefits (% GDP) 
 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Contrib. 8.4 8.6 8.4 7.8 7.2 6.6 6.0 5.5 5.2 
     Male 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.2 3.9 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.8 
     Female 4.0 4.1 3.9 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.3 
Benef. 14.7 17.6 21.7 26.0 29.1 30.3 30.4 29.5 28.0 
     Male 6.3 7.8 9.9 12.3 14.2 15.0 15.1 14.8 14.2 
     Female 8.4 9.8 11.8 13.7 15.0 15.3 15.2 14.7 13.8 
Balance -6.3 -9.0 -13.3 -18.2 -22.0 -23.7 -24.3 -23.9 -22.9 
     Male -1.9 -3.3 -5.4 -8.1 -10.3 -11.4 -11.8 -11.8 -11.4 
     Female -4.4 -5.7 -7.9 -10.1 -11.7 -12.3 -12.5 -12.1 -11.5 
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Source: Authors. 
Figure 4 shows a comparison between the Scn1 benefits and the benefits under the Baseline scenario, 
throughout the projection. It is clear that expenditure with benefits would be significantly higher if 
there was no reform (Brazil Const. amend. 103, 2019). Even if it does not eliminate the deficit, the 
reform has a clear positive impact on the fiscal burden. 
Figure 4: Impact on benefits (a) Male, (b) Female and (c) Total 
Figure 4.a – Male 
 
Figure 4.b - Female 
 




3.2. Scenario 2: linking retirement age to longevity and equalizing retirement ages 
The following scenario (Scn2) goes in the same direction as the 2019 reform and aims to proceed with 
the increase of the retirement age, by linking it to the increments in longevity of the whole Brazilian 
population, according to projections. The measure would be applicable only when the transition rules 
end up, in 2028 (men) and 2032 (women). The increase in the retirement age will be the same as the 
increment in life expectancy. 
In order to suppress the inequality resulting from different retirement ages for men and women, 
another change is proposed. Starting in 2032, an additional increase of three months per year will be 
added to women’s retirement age, so that from 2038 on retirement age will be the same for men and 
women. Eq. 1 will be replaced with Eq. 17 and 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑝  in Eq. 9 will be replaced with the expression 
in Eq. 18. 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑏 = 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑏 − 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝐴𝑔𝑒
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑛2
5
 Eq. 17 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑏 = 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑏 + 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝐴𝑔𝑒
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑛2
5
, Eq. 18 
where 
































𝑅𝑒𝑓𝐴𝑔𝑒 = 65(62/62.25/62.5/ …/65),  and 𝑎𝑝  is the life expectancy of the whole population in 
year 𝑡. 
Increasing the entitlement age is possibly one of the most widespread solutions in the reform of 
PAYG systems. As people tend to understand the reasoning behind this measure, it is not bad also 
from a policymaker`s perspective. This scenario affects both sides, increasing the contributions (re-
ceived longer) and decreasing the benefits (paid for shorter periods) as it affects the numbers of con-
tributors and beneficiaries. 
Table 4: Scn2 - Contributions and Benefits (% GDP) 
 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Contrib. 8.4 9.5 10.0 10.2 9.9 9.5 8.9 8.3 7.7 
     Male 4.4 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.0 4.8 4.5 4.2 3.9 
     Female 4.0 4.6 5.0 5.1 4.9 4.7 4.4 4.1 3.8 
Benef. 14.7 13.5 14.1 15.0 16.0 16.5 16.4 15.9 15.4 
     Male 6.3 5.9 7.1 7.6 8.2 8.5 8.5 8.2 8.0 
     Female 8.4 7.6 7.0 7.4 7.8 8.0 8.0 7.7 7.4 
Balance -6.3 -4.0 -4.1 -4.8 -6.1 -7.0 -7.5 -7.5 -7.7 
     Male -1.9 -1.0 -2.1 -2.5 -3.2 -3.7 -3.9 -4.0 -4.1 
     Female -4.4 -3.0 -1.9 -2.3 -2.9 -3.3 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 
Source: Authors. 
Table 4 (cf. Eq. 1 to Eq. 13 and Eq. 17 to Eq. 19) shows a great positive impact on the balance. Indexing 
the retirement age to longevity after the transition rules end up is a possible path to the sustainability 
of the pension system. Additionally, in 2040 the deficit in balance is projected to be (- 4.1%) lower in 
comparison with the one in the Baseline setting (-7.0%). 
Table 5 displays the average age of the population and the new retirement age by linking it to the 
average age of the population. 𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝐴𝑔𝑒 denotes the average age of the population and 𝑅𝑒𝑡. 𝐴𝑔𝑒 de-
notes the new retirement age in this scenario. Furthermore, for the whole population it was calculated 
as the weighted average of males and females. 
Table 5: Scn2 - average age and new retirement age 
 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Avg. Age. 35.0 38.4 41.6 44.4 46.5 48.2 49.1 49.6 49.8 
     Male 34.0 37.2 40.3 43.0 45.2 46.8 47.9 48.5 48.8 
     Female 35.9 39.4 42.7 45.5 47.7 49.4 50.4 50.9 51.2 
Ret. Age. 58.5 62.9 66.1 68.9 71.2 72.8 73.8 74.3 74.6 
     Male 61.0 65.0 66.1 68.9 71.2 72.8 73.8 74.3 74.6 
     Female 56.0 61.0 66.1 68.9 71.2 72.8 73.8 74.3 74.6 
Source: Authors. 
Although results show a significant improvement, this measure will not fully eliminate the deficit. 
Further, according to (Koutronas & Yew, 2017), in many cases such reforms have proved to be not so 
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effective to pension systems after all, with an insufficient linkage among contributions and benefits. 
For these reasons, four new scenarios will be defined next. They result from a more extreme approach: 
to gradually replace the public PAYG with private FDC schemes (Scn3 and Scn4) or with a public NDC 
system (Scn5 and Scn6), considering all the costs involved, including the burden of a minimum guar-
anteed pension (MGP).  
3.3. Scenarios 3 and 4: transition from PAYG DB to private FDC pension schemes 
We will assume now that a transition from the PAYG Brazilian system to private FDC pension 
schemes will take place, starting in 2030. Under the DC scheme, people entering the labor market from 
2030 on will receive their pension benefits as an annuity, the amount of payments depending on the 
accumulated balance in their respective accounts. Contributions will be calculated in the same way as 
in the ‘old’ DB system. 
Two scenarios will be considered: (i) Scn3/partial shift option - 50% of the cohorts will contribute 
to the new system and the other 50% to the old system; Scn4/full shift option - all new cohorts entering 
the labor market will contribute to the new system. Under Scn3, new participants can choose the scheme 
where contributions go to. For instance, it was observed in Peru (1993), Argentina (1994), Colombia 
(1994) and Uruguay (1995) (Bonasia & Napolitano, 2006). Chile (1981) was the first country to im-
plement Scn4. Other examples are Mexico (1997), Bolivia (1997) and El Salvador (1998) (Bonasia & 
Napolitano, 2006). We start with the technical aspects specific to this approach. 
3.3.1. Individual account balance under a FDC Scheme 
In order to calculate the balance of the individual accounts, the working-age population was divided 
into quintiles according to income level for the MGP calculations basis and to estimate government 
responsibility, and into age cohorts of five years each. 𝐴𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑐  denotes the contribution per cap-
ita of quintile 𝑞 of cohort 𝑐 in year 𝑡 and is given by 
𝐴𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑐 = 𝑖𝑠 × 𝐴𝑣 × 𝑐𝑟𝑑𝑐, Eq. 20 
where 𝑖𝑠  is the income share of quintile 𝑞 and 𝑐𝑟𝑑𝑐 is the contribution rate defined as the same con-
tribution rate for the DB system. Eq. 21 gives the amount in the account in year 𝑡  for a worker in 
quintile 𝑞 of cohort 𝑐 (𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑑𝑐 ), 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑑𝑐 = 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑑𝑐 (1 + 𝑖𝑓𝑑𝑐 ) + 𝐴𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑐
𝑐𝑦
12
, Eq. 21 
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where 𝑖𝑓𝑑𝑐  is the real rate of return (the nominal interest rate corrected from the effects of inflation), 
and 𝑐𝑦 is the average number of contributions to the individual account per year, to include unemploy-
ment periods and other events that result in temporary pauses in contributions. The account balance 
raises up each year until it reaches its maximum level the year before retirement. 
At the time of retirement, a whole life annuity is purchased using the balance in the account. Each 





, Eq. 22 
where 𝑎∗( ) denotes the expected present value of a whole life annuity that makes 13 payments per 
year in arrear (see Brazilian law 4,281/1963). Basis: the most recent mortality table for Brazil from the 
U (United Nations, 2019 a) N which accounts for updates until 2100 and the current structure of inter-
est rates for a specific time calculation. 
3.3.2. Social security expenditure under a FDC Scheme 
Contributions made to the accounts of low-salary participants may not be enough to purchase a pension 
(at least) equal to the MGP. The government is responsible for paying the amount necessary to cover 
the difference. In order to evaluate this liability, the MGP is compared to the average annual pension 
of quintile 𝑞  of cohort 𝑐  in year 𝑡 , to see whether it is necessary to cover a difference or not. 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑓𝑑𝑐  denotes the total government expenditure in year 𝑡 and is given by Eq. 23. 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑓𝑑𝑐 = (𝑀𝐺𝑃 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑑𝑐 )𝐼 × 𝐵𝑛𝑓𝑝𝑑𝑐 , Eq. 23 
where 𝐼 = 1, if  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑑𝑐 < MGP , and 𝐼 = 0 otherwise; 𝐵𝑛𝑓𝑝𝑑𝑐  is the number of benefi-
ciaries of quintile 𝑞 and cohort 𝑐 in year 𝑡. Thus, total benefits, 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑐 , and total contribu-
tions, 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑑𝑐 , are given by: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑐 = 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑓𝑑𝑐 , Eq. 24 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑑𝑐 = 0. Eq. 25 
Using Eq. 24 and Eq. 25, the net cash flow is 
𝑁𝑐𝑓𝑑𝑐 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑑𝑐 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑐 . Eq. 26 
While the two systems coexist, the total expenditure is 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑓𝑑𝑐  and the total of revenue 
is 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑏𝑓𝑑𝑐  and may be calculated as 
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𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑓𝑑𝑐 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑏 +  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑐 , Eq. 27 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑏𝑓𝑑𝑐 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑏 +  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑑𝑐 , Eq. 28 
Using Eq. 27 and Eq. 28, the net cash flow is 
𝑁𝑐𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑓𝑑𝑐 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑏𝑓𝑑𝑐 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑓𝑑𝑐 . Eq. 29 
Numeric results follow for each of Scn3 and Scn4. 
3.3.3. Scenario 3: Transition from a PAYG to a private FDC scheme in partial shift 
Using Eq. 1 to Eq. 6 and Eq. 20 to Eq. 29, we obtain the projections in Table 6. 
Table 6: Scn3 - Contributions and Benefits (% GDP) 
 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Contrib. 8.4 9.4 8.4 7.0 5.5 4.1 3.5 3.2 3.0 
     Male 4.4 4.8 4.3 3.7 2.9 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6 
     Female 4.0 4.5 4.1 3.3 2.6 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.4 
Benef. 14.7 13.5 16.5 20.9 24.2 26.0 22.3 17.5 13.9 
     Male 6.3 5.9 7.7 10.0 11.9 13.1 11.4 8.9 7.0 
     Female 8.4 7.6 8.8 10.9 12.4 12.9 10.9 8.6 6.9 
Balance -6.3 -4.1 -8.1 -13.9 -18.8 -21.9 -18.8 -14.3 -10.9 
     Male -1.9 -1.1 -3.3 -6.3 -9.0 -10.9 -9.6 -7.2 -5.5 
     Female -4.4 -3.1 -4.8 -7.6 -9.8 -11.0 -9.2 -7.1 -5.5 
Source: Authors. 
Besides the initial balance improvement, Scn3 causes also a substantial increment in private sav-
ings, cf. Table 7. 
𝐼𝐴𝑇𝑆 denotes the total stock generated by the individual accounts in the new pension scheme (see 
Eq. 21), 𝑇𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 is the transition cost of switching from a DB system to a DC system, calculated as the 
difference between the contributions before and after implementing the DC system, and MGP is the 
cost of the minimum guaranteed pension (see Eq. 23). 
Table 7: Scn3 – other CFs (% GDP) 
 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Tcost 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.6 2.5 3.2 3.7 3.4 3.1 
     Male 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.3 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.6 
     Female 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.2 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 
IATS 0.0 0.1 3.5 12.4 26.8 46.5 66.4 76.8 82.3 
     Male 0.0 0.0 1.8 6.3 13.7 23.7 34.4 39.8 42.3 
     Female 0.0 0.0 1.7 6.1 13.1 22.8 32.0 37.1 40.0 
MGP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
     Male 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
     Female 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Source: Authors. 
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3.3.4. Scenario 4: Transition from a PAYG to a private FDC scheme in full shift 
Table 8 (cf. Eq. 1 to Eq. 6 and Eq. 20 to Eq. 29) shows that with Scn4 there is a negative temporary effect 
over the sustainability of the system in the short term, followed by a positive impact in the long term. 
As expected, the transition cost in this scenario (see Table 9, Eq. 21 and Eq. 23) is greater than the one in 
the partial shift case (see Table 7) and savings generated are greater, due to the full shift. 
Table 8: Scn4 - Contributions and Benefits (% GDP) 
 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Contrib. 8.4 9.2 7.3 4.9 2.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
     Male 4.4 4.8 3.8 2.6 1.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
     Female 4.0 4.5 3.5 2.3 1.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Benef. 14.7 13.5 16.5 20.9 24.2 25.9 18.2 9.0 2.9 
     Male 6.3 5.9 7.7 10.0 11.9 13.1 9.5 4.5 1.3 
     Female 8.4 7.6 8.8 10.9 12.4 12.8 8.7 4.5 1.6 
Balance -6.3 -4.3 -9.2 -15.9 -21.6 -25.4 -18.2 -9.0 -2.9 
     Male -1.9 -1.1 -3.9 -7.4 -10.4 -12.7 -9.5 -4.5 -1.3 
     Female -4.4 -3.1 -5.3 -8.6 -11.2 -12.6 -8.7 -4.5 -1.6 
Source: Authors. 
Table 9: Scn4 - other CFs (% GDP) 
 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Tcost 0.0 0.0 1.2 3.2 4.9 6.4 7.3 6.7 6.2 
     Male 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.6 2.5 3.3 3.9 3.6 3.3 
     Female 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.6 2.4 3.2 3.5 3.2 2.9 
IATS 0.0 0.1 7.0 24.8 53.5 93.1 132.9 153.7 164.7 
     Male 0.0 0.1 3.6 12.7 27.3 47.5 68.9 79.5 84.7 
     Female 0.0 0.1 3.4 12.2 26.2 45.6 64.0 74.1 80.0 
MGP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
     Male 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
     Female 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Source: Authors. 
3.4. Scenarios 5 and 6: Transition from a PAYG to a public NDC pension scheme 
We will assume now that a transition from the PAYG Brazilian system to a public NDC pension 
scheme will take place, starting in 2030. According to (Holzmann, Palmer, & Robalino, 2013), the 
NDC may be viewed as a middle ground between PAYG and FDC. (Simonovits, 2006) point out that 
NDC schemes have most of the advantages of the FDC design (for instance, the robust connection 
among formal market, individual savings and pension benefits) and also present other advantageous 
features, for instance, they deal with the longevity risk by linking the pension benefits to whole life 
annuities, and are sometimes a less costly way to move to a DC scheme (Brooks & Weaver, 2005). 
27 
Basically, the two main issues when shifting from PAYG DB to NDC are: (i) how to transform 
rights of workers in the old scheme into rights in the new NDC scheme; (ii) how to quantify the un-
financed legacy from the old scheme, which should be financed by general revenues (Palmer, 2006). 
Additionally, a NDC scheme provides no direct contribution to national saving during the build-
up phase to maturity. Unlike in the FDC scheme, where the cash in the accounts is invested in market 
assets and participants earn a market rate of return, in the NDC scheme, by definition, the individual 
account is a notional DC scheme and participants earn an internal rate of return, determined by econ-
omy development (Holzmann & Palmer, 2006). Furthermore, current contributions are used to pay 
current pensions, as in PAYG scheme, and individual account values represent only a claim on a future 
pension (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2007)  
Again, two scenarios will be considered: (i) Scn5/partial shift option - 50% of the cohorts will 
contribute to the new system and the other 50% to the old system; Scn6/full shift option - all new 
cohorts entering the labor market will contribute to the new system. Partial Shift was observed in 
Greece (2012) (Actuarial Association of Europe, 2019). Sweden (1991-1998) was the first country to 
shift from a public PAYG to a public NDC. Other examples of full shift are Italy (1995), Norway 
(2009), Poland (1997-1998) and Latvia (1996) (Guardiancich, Weaver, Demarco, & Dorfman, 2019). 
This option for a full shift to a scheme based on notional individual accounts has the advantages of 
avoiding the transition costs and risk shifting that occur in a switch to a FDC scheme (Holzmann, 
Palmer, & Robalino, 2013). 
3.4.1. Individual notional account balance under a NDC Scheme 
This part follows closely section 3.3.1, as the main differences result from the fact that the individual 
accounts are not funded and the rate of return is based on the average wage growth rate rather than on 
a market rate of return. Hence, the account value at the end of each year consists of contributions 
accumulated during the year plus the accumulated value from the previous years, which is indexed by 
the average rate of growth of earnings per contributor (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, 2007). Therefore, AccBalndc , the balance in the notional account of quintile 𝑞 and cohort 𝑐 
in year 𝑡, is calculated as follows: 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑐 = 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑐 × (1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐 ) + 𝐴𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑐
𝑐𝑦
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, Eq. 30 
where 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐  is the financial rate based on the average wage growth. 






. Eq. 31 
3.4.2. Expenditure, revenue and net cash flow under a public NDC scheme 
Unlike in the case of private FDC schemes, where the public pension expenditure is the amount to 
cover the MGP, in the case of a public NDC scheme pension expenditure consists of total pensions. 
Thus, the government collects all the contributions, and it is in charge of paying the pension benefits. 
By the same idea of Eq. 23, 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑛𝑑𝑐  denotes the total government expenditure in year 𝑡. 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑛𝑑𝑐 = (𝑀𝐺𝑃 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑐 )𝐼 × 𝐵𝑛𝑓𝑝𝑑𝑐 , Eq. 32 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑛𝑑𝑐  denotes the total benefits, 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑐  denotes the total contributions and are 
given by 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑛𝑑𝑐 = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑐 × 𝐵𝑛𝑓𝑝𝑑𝑐 + 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑛𝑑𝑐 ) Eq. 33 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑐 = 𝐴𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑐 × 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑏 . Eq. 34 
Using Eq. 33 and Eq. 34, the net cash flow is 
𝑁𝑐𝑓𝑛𝑑𝑐 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑐 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑛𝑑𝑐 . Eq. 35 
While the two systems coexist, the total expenditure and the total contributions are 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑛𝑑𝑐 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑏 +  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑛𝑑𝑐 , Eq. 36 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑏𝑛𝑑𝑐 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑏 +  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑐 . Eq. 37 
Using now Eq. 36 and Eq. 37 the net cash flow is 
𝑁𝑐𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑛𝑑𝑐 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑏𝑛𝑑𝑐 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑏𝑛𝑑𝑐 . Eq. 38 
Numeric results follow for each of Scn5 and Scn6. 
3.4.3.  Scenario 5: Transition from a PAYG to a public NDC scheme in partial shift 
A material effect is observed (see Table 10 and cf. Eq. 1 to Eq. 6, Eq. 20, Eq. 23 and Eq. 30 to Eq. 38). 
Revenue is the same as in the Baseline scenario because the same contribution rate was assumed. 
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Table 10: Scn5 - Contributions and Benefits (% GDP) 
 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Contrib. 8.4 9.5 9.5 9.0 8.3 7.6 7.0 6.4 6.0 
     Male 4.4 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.4 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.2 
     Female 4.0 4.6 4.6 4.3 4.0 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.8 
Benef. 14.7 13.5 16.5 20.9 24.2 26.0 22.7 18.3 14.9 
     Male 6.3 5.9 7.7 10.0 11.9 13.1 11.6 9.3 7.6 
     Female 8.4 7.6 8.8 10.9 12.4 12.9 11.1 9.0 7.3 
Balance -6.3 -4.0 -7.0 -11.9 -15.9 -18.4 -15.7 -11.9 -8.9 
     Male -1.9 -1.0 -2.7 -5.3 -7.5 -9.1 -7.9 -5.9 -4.4 
     Female -4.4 -3.0 -4.2 -6.6 -8.4 -9.3 -7.8 -6.0 -4.5 
Source: Authors. 
As the individual accounts are notional in the NDC scheme, the country cannot benefit from the 
savings generated (see Table 11, Eq. 30 and Eq. 32). The transition cost is the same as the one in Scn3. 
Table 11: Scn5 - other CFs (% GDP) 
 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Tcost 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.6 2.5 3.2 3.7 3.4 3.1 
     Male 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.3 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.6 
     Female 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.2 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 
IATS - - - - - - - - - 
     Male - - - - - - - - - 
     Female - - - - - - - - - 
MGP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 
     Male 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
     Female 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Source: Authors. 
3.4.4. Scenario 6: Transition from a PAYG to a public NDC scheme in fully shift 
Table 12: Scn6 - Contributions and Benefits (% GDP) 
 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Contrib. 8.4 9.5 9.5 9.0 8.3 7.6 7.0 6.4 6.0 
     Male 4.4 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.4 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.2 
     Female 4.0 4.6 4.6 4.3 4.0 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.8 
Benef. 14.7 13.5 16.5 20.9 24.2 25.9 19.1 10.7 4.9 
     Male 6.3 5.9 7.7 10.0 11.9 13.1 10.0 5.4 2.3 
     Female 8.4 7.6 8.8 10.9 12.4 12.8 9.1 5.3 2.6 
Balance -6.3 -4.0 -7.0 -11.9 -15.9 -18.3 -12.0 -4.2 1.1 
     Male -1.9 -1.0 -2.7 -5.3 -7.5 -9.1 -6.3 -2.0 0.8 
     Female -4.4 -3.0 -4.2 -6.6 -8.4 -9.2 -5.8 -2.3 0.2 
Source: Authors 
Table 12 (cf. Eq. 1 to Eq. 6, Eq. 20, Eq. 23, Eq. 30 to Eq. 38) shows a positive impact in the long term. 
In fact, it is the ‘best scenario’ in the sense that there is even a surplus in 2100. The surplus outcomes 
from the fact that contributions are made at the same level of the Baseline scenario (see Table 3) and 
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benefits are now “less expensive”, as they are provided by a whole life annuity purchased using the 
balance in the notional account immediately before retirement (subject to MGP criterion). As expected, 
the transition cost in this scenario (see Table 13, Eq. 30 and Eq. 32) is greater than the one in the partial 
shift case (see Table 11) and equal to the FDC full shift case (see Table 9). 
Table 13: Scn6 - other CFs (% GDP) 
 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Tcost 0.0 0.0 1.2 3.2 4.9 6.4 7.3 6.7 6.2 
     Male 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.6 2.5 3.3 3.9 3.6 3.3 
     Female 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.6 2.4 3.2 3.5 3.2 2.9 
IATS - - - - - - - - - 
     Male - - - - - - - - - 
     Female - - - - - - - - - 
MGP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 
     Male 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 
     Female 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Source: Authors. 
Summarizing, results show that, if no additional measures are taken, the deficit will decrease over 
roughly the next ten years, then an increase will be observed from that time on - although of a reduced 
amount, in comparison with a pre-2019 reform scenario (Scn1). Indexing the retirement age to longev-
ity (Scn2) showed a way to achieve sustainability. Scn3 and Scn4 correspond to substantial increments 
in private savings and support the sustainability of the pension system in the long run. Scn5 and Scn6 
also have a very positive response in terms of the long run sustainability, in particular Scn6. 
4. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to examine the Brazilian pension system, which has incurred in a deficit for a 
long time, to project its cash flows until 2100, following the 2019 reform, and to present parametric 
and systematic scenarios with additional changes, still required to guarantee the sustainability of the 
system in the long run. 
For this purpose, all relevant concepts and methodologies were detailed in Section 2 (the work 
followed closely the methodology established in (Acosta-Ormaechea, Espinosa-Vega, & Wachs, 
2017)). After setting the framework, several different proposals (scenarios) to help solving the deficit 
problem have been suggested.  
Findings proved that the 2019 reform (Baseline) improves the balance and allows the huge deficit 
in RGPS to decrease, but not as much as required. Therefore, it is very likely that the discussion about 
the sustainability of the system will again be the order of the day in a few years. Figures show that the 
deficit will decrease over the next 10 years, then an increase will be observed from that time on - 
31 
although of a much smaller amount than that in a pre-reform scenario (Scenario 1). In fact, the 2019 
reform is a good starting point to fight the existing disequilibrium. 
Various recommendations for action can now be suggested. Linking retirement age to longevity is 
a way to address the sustainability problem properly. Moving into DC may be a fair option, in the 
sense that benefits are fully linked to contributions, not to mention that there is a possible boost in 
economic growth through the accrued savings. However, it is important to emphasize that this is not 
an easy transition and most of the risks may fall entirely on pensioners. In Brazil, this can be in some 
way mitigated, as pension benefits cannot be below the minimum wage by law. The full shift to public 
NDC (Scenario 6) appears to be the most effective strategy in the long run, but a decision must fit in the 
short and medium terms. 
The limitations come mostly from the lack of data. For instance, the constraint that pension benefits 
cannot be below the minimum wage was proxied by assuming that they will increase according to the 
CPI – an assumption about the income distribution by cohorts of pensioners would be necessary and 
there is not enough information. Another issue is that the forecast of the population that is available 
was made taking five-year age groups, but it would be desirable to have information per age. There is 
also lack of data by gender, for instance concerning the unemployment rate, the labor force participa-
tion rate and the size of the informal sector. 
Future research on the topic is linked to the limitations described before. The essential point is to 
complete data, so that the analysis can be more accurate and extended to the other regimes. The pension 
system in the country is so complex that many different studies can be conducted. Last but not least, 
to study the possible effects of the current pandemic on the projections is also another important matter 
these days. Performing a sensitivity analysis assessing such effects on each of the alternative scenarios 
is relevant, since it is quite obvious that the alterations in the projections resulting from this crisis will 
convey additional issues to the problem 
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Appendix - Assumptions 
We detail here the demographic, macroeconomic and pension assumptions used in the paper, the source and a brief description of each one. 
 
A. Demographic assumptions 
The population is the existing data throughout the projected horizon, it is on an annual basis divided by five-year age groups and for the analysis 
is the medium fertility variant. 
The population growth rate is assumed to be calculated as the ratio of total population and its previous value minus one. 
The labor force participation rate is the available data until its last available value (2030), thereafter it is assumed to stay constant at the average 
of the last 5 available values (2026-2030) throughout the projected horizon and it is a percentage of total population ages 15-64. 
Table A1 – Description of demographic parameters 
 Male Female Total Source 
Population (106) 104.4 108.1 212.6 United Nations4 (United Nations, 2019 a) 
Population growth rate 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% Author calculations 
Labor force participation rate 80.1% 61.1% 70.5% International Labour Organization5 (International Labour Organization, 2017) 
Source: Author. 
B. Macroeconomic assumptions 
The unemployment rate is assumed from the available data until its last available value (2024), thereafter it is assumed to stay constant at the 
average of the last 5 available values (2020-2024) throughout the projected horizon and it is a percentage of total youth adults ages 25+. 
The size of formal sector is assumed is the existing data until its last available value (2015), thereafter it is assumed to stay constant at the average 
of the last 5 available values (2011-2015) throughout the projected horizon and it is a percentage of non-agriculture employment of a harmonized 
series. 
The GDP deflator is the existing data until the last available value (2024), thereafter is assumed to be the multiplication of its previous value and 
the factor of inflation rate throughout the projected horizon. 
The inflation rate (GDP deflator growth rate) is assumed to be calculated as the ratio of the GDP deflator and its previous value minus one until 
the last available value (2024) and thereafter it is assumed to stay constant at the average of the last 5 available values (2020-2024) throughout the 
projected horizon. 
The GDP deflator index is assumed to be calculated as the ratio of the GDP deflator and its value in 2020 minus one until the last available value 
(2024). 
The GDP (current prices) is the existing data until its last available value (2024) and thereafter will be calculated as a multiplication of the factor 
of the nominal GDP (current prices) growth rate and its previous value throughout the projected horizon. 
                                               
4 Available at: https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/CSV/ 
5 Available at: https://www.ilo.org/shinyapps/bulkexplorer9/?lang=en&segment=&id=EAP_2WAP_SEX_AGE_RT_A 
12 
The nominal GDP (current prices) growth rate is assumed to be calculated as the ratio of GDP (current prices) and its previous value minus one 
until the last available value (2024), thereafter is assumed to be calculated as a multiplication of the factors of real GDP per capita growth rate, 
population growth rate and inflation rate minus one. 
The real GDP (current prices) growth rate is assumed to be calculated as the ratio of the division of the GDP (current prices) for its previous 
value and the division of the GDP deflator and its previous value minus one throughout the projected horizon. 
The GDP (constant prices) is assumed to be calculated as the ratio of the GDP (current prices) and the GDP deflator index until the last available 
value (2024). 
The real GDP (current prices) per capita is assumed to be calculated as the ratio of the GDP (constant prices) and the total population until the 
last available value (2024). 
The real GDP (current prices) per capita growth rate is assumed to be calculated as the ratio of the real GDP (current prices) per capita and its 
previous value minus one until the end of the last data available (2024), thereafter it is assumed to stay constant at the average of the last 5 available 
values (2020-2024) throughout the projected horizon. 
The compensation of employees is the existing data until its last available value (2017) weighted by the average of the last 5 available values (2009-
2014) of the wage gap gender. 
The wage gap gender is the existing data until the last available value (2014), thereafter it is assumed to stay constant at the average of the last 5 
available values (2009-2014) throughout the projected horizon. 
The wage share is assumed to stay constant at the average of the ratio of the compensation of employees and GDP (current price) of the last 5 
available values (2013-2017) until its last available value (2024), thereafter is obtained on the basis of the aggregate wages in the economy and 
GDP. 
The real wage growth rate is assumed to stay constant at the ratio of the factor of the average of the last 5 available values (2020-2024) of the 
GDP (current prices) growth rate and the factor of the average of the last 5 available values (2020-2024) of the inflation rate throughout the 
projected horizon. 
The discount rate6 is assumed to be a division of the real interest rate minus the real GDP (current prices) growth rate over the real GDP (current 
prices) growth rate plus one and it was set to be 1% throughout the projected horizon. 
The real interest rate is assumed to be the multiplication of the discount rate and the factor of the real GDP (current prices) growth rate plus the 
real GDP (current prices) growth rate throughout the projected horizon. 
The financial rate of return is assumed to be the multiplication of the factor of the real interest rate and the factor of the inflation rate minus one 
throughout the projected horizon. 
The income share held by the lowest 20% is the existing data until the last available value (2018), thereafter it is assumed to stay constant at the 
average of the last 5 available values (2014-2018) throughout the projected horizon. 
                                               
6 The rational is the interest paid in year 𝑡 as a ratio to debt outstanding at the end of year 𝑡 − 1, which constitutes a safe proxy for the interest rate, roughly equal 1%, and it is 
equivalent to the average interest rate-growth differential (Escolano, 2010; Kogan, Stone, DaSilva, & Rejeski, 2015). 
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Table A2 - Description of macroeconomic parameters 
 Male Female Total Source 
Unemployment rate 7.3% 10.8% 8.8% International Labour Organization7 (Internation Labour Organization, 2019) 
Size of formal sector 61.5% 62.7% 62.0% International Labour Organization8 (International Labour Organization, 2018) 
GDP deflator 631  631  631  International Monetary Fund9 (International Monetary Fund, 2019) 
Inflation rate 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% Author calculations 
GDP deflator index 100  100  100  Author calculations 
GDP (current prices) (109) 7,650  7,650  7,650  International Monetary Fund9 (International Monetary Fund, 2019) 
Nominal GDP (current prices) growth rate 6.3% 6.3% 6.3% Author calculations 
Real GDP (current prices) growth rate 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% Author calculations 
GDP (constant prices) (109) 7,650  7,650  7,650  Author calculations 
Real GDP (current prices) per capita 73,248  70,750  35,989  Author calculations 
Real GDP (current prices) per capita growth rate 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% Author calculations 
Compensation of employees (109) 1,507  1,296  2,802  United Nations10 (United Nations, 2019 b) 
Wage gap gender 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% International Labour Organization11 (International Labour Organization, 2018) 
Wage share 23.5% 20.2% 43.8% Author calculations 
Real wage growth rate 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% Author calculations 
Discount Rate 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% Author calculations 
Real interest rate 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% Author calculations 
Financial rate of return 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% Author calculations 
Income share held by the lowest 20% 3.10% 3.10% 3.10% World Bank12 
Source: Author. 
 
C. Pension assumptions 
The replacement rate is assumed to stay constant at the average between the available values (2014 & 2018). 
The contribution rate is assumed to stay constant at the level of the last available value (2020). 
The retirement age (after transition) is assumed to stay constant at the level of the last available value (2020). 
                                               
7 Available at: https://www.ilo.org/shinyapps/bulkexplorer49/?lang=en&segment=&id=UNE_2EAP_SEX_AGE_RT_A 
8 Available at: https://www.ilo.org/shinyapps/bulkexplorer37/?lang=en&segment=&id=IFL_4IEM_SEX_ECO_IFL_RT_A 
9 Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2019/October/download-entire-database 
10 Available at: http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Compensation+of+employees&d=SNA&f=group_code%3a401%3bitem_code%3a20 
11 Available at: https://www.ilo.org/shinyapps/bulkexplorer37/?lang=en&segment=&id=IFL_4IEM_SEX_ECO_IFL_RT_A 
12 Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.DST.FRST.20 
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The retirement age (initial) is assumed to stay constant at the level of the last available value (2020). 
The minimum pension is assumed to stay constant at the level of the last available value (2020). 
The average number of contributions per year to stay constant at the latest available value (2009) in Chile. 
The life expectancy (after retirement) is assumed to stay constant at the latest available value (2018). 
Table A3 - Description of pension parameters 
 Male Female Total Source 
Replacement rate 61.20% 52.50% 56.78% OECD13 (United Nations, 2019 a) 
Contribution rate 28.00% 28.00% 28.00% USA Social Security administration14 (Social Security Administration, 2019) 
Retirement age (after transition) 65.0  62.0  63.5  Ministry of Finance 
Retirement age (initial) 61.0  56.0  58.5  Ministry of Finance 
Minimum pension 13,585  13,585  13,585  Ministry of Finance15 
Average months of contributions per year 6.0  6.0  6.0  Ministry of Finance16 (Chile) 
Life expectancy (after retirement) 22.7  27.4  25.0  UN mortality table (United Nations, 2019 a) 
Source: Author. 
                                               
13 Available at: https://data.oecd.org/pension/gross-pension-replacement-rates.htm 
14 Available at: https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2018-2019/americas/brazil.pdf 
15 For more details, https://www.gov.br/economia/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2020/02/novas-aliquotas-da-previdencia-entram-em-vigor-em-1o-de-marco 
16 Available at: https://www.dipres.gob.cl/598/articles-58451_doc_pdf.pdf 
